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INTRODUCTION

At first glance, the last phrase of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution seems easily understandable. Read literally, all that it requires in a criminal case is that "the accused shall...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 1 While one may
think that this language merely entitles a defendant to assistance of an
attorney during trial, the United States Supreme Court (the Supreme
Court) has held that "to deprive a person of counsel during the period
prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the
trial itself."2 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel means that an
accused is "entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that
1.U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (emphasis added).
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judicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 3 In Powell v.
Alabama,4 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guaranty is applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.5 Furthermore, due process requires that
states appoint counsel for criminal defendants who cannot afford
counsel.6
Although the Supreme Court has declined to specifically mandate
what constitutes initiation of a judicial proceeding, 7 Texas courts generally hold that initiation begins when a defendant is arraigned or
when a formal indictment has been brought.8 Once the right to counsel attaches, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent "critical stages" at which the
right to counsel applies.9
Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made-and a person
who had previously been just a "suspect" has become an "accused"
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment-the constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the po-

lice may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from
an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at

an earlier stage of their investigation.1 °

Simply stated, once a defendant's right to counsel has attached to a
particular charge, the government may no longer question the defendant about that crime without obtaining permission from the defendant's attorney.11 The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific." 12 Therefore,
3. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. See id. at 71 ("[T]he failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment
of counsel was . . .a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
7. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 228 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. United States,
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)) (using vague language of "'at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings'" with no guidelines as to what specifically constitutes initiation).
8. Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) ("In
Texas, a criminal prosecution is variously considered to be in progress after the accused has been formally arrested and taken before a magistrate, or when he has been
indicted or charged by complaint and information with a criminal offense.").
9. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986).
10. id. at 632.
11. Id. at 636.
12. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). See also id. at 174-75, 181
(refusing to exclude incriminating statements made by a defendant who had been
indicted for armed robbery when the statements regarded the crimes of murder, attempted murder, and armed burglary, for which he had not yet been indicted). Cf.
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990) (excluding incriminating statements
made by a defendant regarding any offenses because the defendant had invoked his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel). Unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not "offense specific." McNeil, 501 U.S. at
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the government is not precluded from eliciting incriminating state13
ments from an indicted defendant about other unindicted crimes.
Until the Supreme Court's recent clarification in Texas v. Cobb, 4 the
"offense specific" protection appeared to be somewhat limited by two
earlier Supreme Court decisions regarding crimes that were closely
related to the indicted crime. 5
The purpose of this Note is to illustrate how the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (the Texas Court), by its decision in Cobb v. State,'6
unnecessarily broadened the provided protections of the Sixth
Amendment beyond those mandated by the Supreme Court.17 In
Cobb, the Texas Court reversed two murder convictions based on an
alleged Sixth Amendment violation that occurred when police obtained a suspect's confession. 8 The Texas Court based its decision on
federal court precedent,' 9 holding that suspects be afforded a right to
counsel for unindicted crimes that are closely related to an indicted
crime.2 0 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Texas Court and
reestablished the offense specific nature of the Sixth Amendment.21
Accordingly, absent a showing of misconduct on the part of authorities, confessions involving crimes that are closely related to previously
indicted crimes should be admissible under federal constitutional
standards.
The issues raised in Cobb, however, do not end with the Supreme
Court's recent decision. Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution provides another version of the right to counsel.2 2 Courts have
often recognized that a state may offer more protections to defendants than those provided by the Federal Constitution.2 3 Thus, the offense specific exceptions to the right to counsel could again come
177. Once a suspect invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel for interrogation
regarding one offense, he may not be approached regarding any other offenses unless
counsel is present. Id. at 176-77.
13. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16
(1985)).
14. 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001), rev'g Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, 2000 WL 275644 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc).
15. See cases cited infra notes 35-41.
16. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, 2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000)
(en banc), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
17. See cases cited infra notes 19-41.
18. See Cobb v. State, slip op. at 1, 7-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *1, *4-5.
19. United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Texas v.
Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
20. See Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 23, 2000 WL 275644, at *13 (McCormick,
J., dissenting).
21. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1344 (2001), rev'g Cobb v. State, No. 72,807,
2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc).

22. The Texas Constitution provides that the accused "shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of being heard by himself or
counsel, or both." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
23. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 174 (1994); Heitman v. State, 815
S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
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before the Texas Court on state, rather than federal, grounds. This
Note argues that the Texas Court should adopt the Supreme Court's
holding in Cobb on state constitutional claims as well, thus avoiding
further entanglement in the "closely related" confusion.
For background purposes, Part II reviews the history of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as provided by the Supreme Court and
other lower courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cobb.
Part III discusses Cobb's facts and procedural history and examines
the analyses of both the Texas Court and the Supreme Court. Part IV
analyzes how the questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court,
prior to Cobb, resulted in the Texas Court's expansion of Sixth
Amendment protections. Additionally, Part IV discusses why the
Texas Court should recognize a defendant's ability to waive his right
to counsel after it has attached-an issue which was not addressed by
the Supreme Court in Cobb. Part V discusses alternative grounds not
considered by the Texas Court that could have also rendered Cobb's
confession admissible. In conclusion, this Note suggests how to resolve future Sixth Amendment questions in Texas.
II.

PRE-COBB DECISIONS ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A.

Supreme Court Decisions

The Supreme Court has held that a defendant's own post-indictment incriminating statements, which are deliberately elicited by authorities, may not be used at the defendant's trial for the same
indicted charge.24 In Massiah v. United States,2 5 the defendant and a
man named Colson were indicted for possession of narcotics aboard a
United States vessel.26 While released on bond, Colson agreed to cooperate with authorities.27 A detective installed a radio transmitter
under Colson's automobile seat in order to hear elicited incriminating
statements from the defendant about the pending charge.2 8 The Supreme Court held "that the [defendant] was denied the basic protections" of the Sixth Amendment when his statements were used against
him at his trial.2 9 The Supreme Court reasoned that allowing police to
interrogate a criminal after indictment for a pending charge "contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes
and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime."30
The Supreme Court reached a different result, however, regarding
post-indictment statements concerning crimes that are unrelated to the
24. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
25. Id. at 201.

26. Id. at 202.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 202-03.

29. Id. at 206.
30. Id. at 205 (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)).
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indicted charge.3 1 In McNeil v. Wisconsin,32 the Supreme Court stated
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated if authorities question an indicted defendant about other crimes that are not
related to the indicted offense.3 3 In McNeil, the defendant sought to
suppress his post-indictment confession of crimes that did not relate to
the indicted charge of armed robbery for which he was being held.34
The Supreme Court rejected his claim, stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "offense specific." 35 The Supreme Court
recognized that excluding evidence of an unindicted crime simply because a defendant was under indictment for another crime "'would
unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of

criminal activities.'

"36

The "offense specific" requirement, however, appeared to be at
least partially limited by two earlier Supreme Court cases decided
before Cobb.37 In Brewer v. Williams,3" the defendant was charged
with abducting a ten-year-old girl.3 9 The investigating detective,
aware of the defendant's religious background and believing the girl
to be dead, used a "Christian burial speech"4 0 to elicit the location of
the girl's body from the defendant. 4 The Supreme Court held that
the defendant's incriminating statements could not be used at his murder trial4 2 despite having been indicted only for the kidnapping offense at the time of the statements.4 3 Similarly, in Maine v. Moulton,4 4
31. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 175.
34. Id. at 174.
35. Id. at 175.
36. Id. at 176 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985)).
37. See cases cited infra notes 38, 44.
38. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
39. Id. at 390.
40. Id. at 392-93.
"Reverend,"... "I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the
weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very
treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They
are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself
are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area
on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body,
that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for
the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than
waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and
possibly not being able to find it at all."
Id. (quoting the investigating detective).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 405-06.
43. Id. at 390.
44. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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the Supreme Court upheld the reversal of a defendant's conviction for
theft and burglary because detectives elicited incriminating statements
from the defendant about both crimes while he was under indictment
only for the theft.4" Significantly, the Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the burglary charge even though the defendant was not
under indictment for that offense at the time of the statements.46
B.

Lower Court Decisions

Largely because the Supreme Court's decisions in Brewer and
Moulton appeared to limit the "offense specific" protections of the
Sixth Amendment, lower courts attempted to define when police were
precluded from questioning an indicted defendant' about an
unindicted charge.47 Beginning in 1988 with People v. Clankie,48
courts began to employ exceptions to the "offense specific" requirement whenever a subsequent charge was related to the originally indicted offense.49 In an attempt to settle when the "offense specific"
exception applied, courts used various names such as "closely related," "extremely closely related," and "inextricably intertwined" °
to determine whether or not the right to counsel attached to an
unindicted charge.5
The "closely related" test was by no means uniformly applied as
federal and state courts used many differing standards. In determining whether an uncharged offense was closely related to the indicted
offense, the Fifth Circuit adopted the same course of conduct test. 2
Specifically, the court noted that where one offense predated the
other, the crimes did not arise from the same course of conduct; therefore, the exception was inapplicable. 53 In one Fifth Circuit case, the
court created another rule when it held that as long as the two of45. See id. at 176-77, 180.
46. Id. at 162-63, 180; Peter Marshall Varney, State v. Adams: When Mommy
Talks, You Better Pay Attention ...and, If No Indictment Has Been Issued, You Can
Use Her Uncounseled Statements Against Her in Court,76 N.C. L. REV. 2388, 2401-02

(1998).
47. See Holly Larson, United States v. Covarrubias: Does the Ninth CircuitAdd to
the Ambiguity of the Inextricably Intertwined Exception?, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV.

1, 18 (2000).

48. 530 N.E.2d 448 (I11.
1988).
49. Larson, supra note 47, at 17.
50. This Note collectively refers to these terms as "closely related."
51. Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 232-36 (Md. 1995).
52. United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991). The defendant
was charged with aggravated robbery. Id. at 740. While in jail, the defendant was
questioned by a federal agent about the defendant's possession of an unlicensed firearm used during the robbery. Id. Prosecutors used information from the interrogation to charge the defendant with possession of an unregistered firearm. Id. at
740-41.
53. See id. at 744 (stating that the Sixth Amendment applies to charges that are
"extremely closely related, involving the same crime..., victim, residence, time span,

and sovereign").
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fenses involved "two distinct types of conduct," the closely related exception did not apply, even if the same evidence was used for the
prosecution of both offenses.5 4
The Tenth Circuit adopted the "same evidence" test, requiring the
court to look at whether both crimes involved the same evidence in
order for the exception to apply.55 The Fourth Circuit adopted the
"factual predicate" test when the court held that the closely related
exception did not apply if the central purpose for committing each
crime differed from one another.56 The First Circuit introduced yet
another standard.5 7 It held that two offenses were closely related if
those offenses arose out of a common "nucleii [sic] of operative fact,"
looking to mutuality of such factors as time of occurrence as well as
the elements involved in the commission of the two crimes. 58
More recently, the Ninth Circuit introduced an even broader and
more inconclusive standard for determining when the offense specific
exception applied when it held:
Deciding whether the exception is applicable requires an examination and comparison of all of the facts and circumstances relating
to the conduct involved, including the identity of the persons involved (including the victim, if any), and the timing, motive, and
location of the crimes. No single factor is ordinarily dispositive; nor
need all of the factors favor application of the exception in order for
the offenses to be deemed inextricably intertwined or closely related-which concepts we, like some of the other circuits, deem to
be the same.... The greater the commonality of the factors and the
54. See United States v. Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1998). The defendant was charged with illegal possession of a firearm and suborning perjury in relation
to the firearm charge. Id. at 520-21. The court refused to apply the "closely related"
exception because illegal firearm possession and perjury were two distinct types of
conduct. Id. at 529-30.
55. United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1991). A
friend of the defendant cooperated with police by secretly taping conversations with
the defendant who was under indictment for drug possession. Id. at 1337-38. The
tapes eventually were used as evidence when the defendant was charged with witness
tampering in relation to the drug possession charge. Id. at 1340. The court held that
the "closely related" exception applied because both offenses involved the same evidence. Id. at 1344-45.
56. United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993). The defendant was
charged with drug charges after government informants tape-recorded the defendant
selling crack cocaine. Id. at 31. After indictment, another drug informant who had no
knowledge of the prior indictment tape-recorded another sell. Id. at 31-32. The court
declined to apply the "closely related" exception because the second charge was factually distinct and independent from the earlier charges. Id. at 33.
57. See United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1988). The defendant was
charged with possession of marijuana. Id. at 34. After indictment, an informant recorded the defendant making a crack cocaine sell. Id. at 34-35. The court declined to
apply the "closely related" exception because both charges required proof of different
elements and occurred at different times. Id. at 38.
58. Id. at 38.
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more directly linked the conduct involved, the more
likely it is that
59
courts will find the exception to be applicable.

Prior to its decision in Cobb, the Texas Court considered the

"closely related" exception in State v. Frye6 ° and Upton v. State.6 1

While the Texas Court appeared to adopt the "closely related" exception in both cases,6 2 it did not explain in either opinion which of the
many views it was following.63 The majority of the Texas Court in
Cobb cited both of
these cases in its ultimate decision to overturn
64
Cobb's conviction.

III.

THE TEXAS v. COBB DECISION

A.

The Facts

Approximately twenty-three months after murdering a mother and
her sixteen-month-old daughter in Walker County, Texas, Raymond
Levi Cobb confessed committing the crime to his father. 65 Cobb's father notified the police in Odessa, Texas, where Cobb had moved
since committing the murders.6 6 After the Odessa police notified

Walker County authorities of Cobb's confession, 67 Walker County investigators arranged for an arrest warrant to be faxed to Odessa.6 8
Although Walker County investigators suspected Cobb had information on the "disappearances" of Margaret and Kori Rae Owings, they
did not have enough evidence to charge him with anything other than

burglarizing the Owings' home.6 9 Walker County investigators had
questioned Cobb about the disappearances on two prior occasions
with the consent of Cobb's court-appointed attorney for the burglary
59. United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted), overruled by Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001). The defendants were
arrested for kidnapping. Id. at 1221-22. After counsel was appointed, an INS agent
questioned the defendants about related federal charges of transporting illegal aliens
across state lines. Id. at 1222. The court applied the "closely related" exception because of the commonality of such factors as conduct, persons, timing, location, and
motivation. Id. at 1226.
60. 897 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
61. 853 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
62. See Frye, 897 S.W.2d at 329-30 (applying the "closely related" exception
where a prosecution intern questioned a suspect about a dismissed misdemeanor theft
charge and used the information to help prosecute a related felony theft charge);
Upton, 853 S.W.2d at 555-56 (applying the "closely related" exception where police
questioned a suspect about a murder after he was already under indictment for the
related crime of stealing the victim's car).
63. See Frye, 897 S.W.2d at 329-30; Upton, 853 S.W.2d at 555-56.
64. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *3 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
65. Id. at 3-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *1-3.
66. Id. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
67. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
68. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
69. See id. at 4-5, 2000 WL 275644, at *2.
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charge.70 While Cobb previously had admitted to committing the burglary, he had denied having any knowledge of the fate of Margaret
and Kori Rae Owings until he finally confessed to his father.7 1
72
After obtaining an arrest warrant, Odessa police arrested Cobb.
Odessa investigators were unaware that Cobb had counsel in the related burglary charge for which he was awaiting trial.73 While in custody, an investigator read Cobb the Miranda warning. 4 Cobb
verbally waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel 75 and confessed
that while committing a burglary, he stabbed twenty-four-year-old
Margaret Owings to death and buried Kori Rae Owings alive.76 After
admitting that he killed Margaret and moved her body to a nearby
wooded area, Cobb stated:
"I went back to her house and I saw the baby laying on its bed. I
took the baby out there and it was sleeping the whole time. I laid
the baby down on the ground four or five feet away from its mother.
I went back to my house and got a flat edge shovel. That's all I
could find. Then I went back over to where they were and I started
digging a hole between them. After I got the hole dug, the baby
was awake. It started going toward its mom and it fell in the hole. I
put the lady in the hole and I covered them up. I remember stabthe ground where they were. I was
bing a different knife
77 I had in
crying right then.",

Cobb subsequently led authorities to the shallow grave of Margaret
and Kori Rae Owings.7 8 At trial, prosecutors presented evidence recovered from the gravesite, 79 Cobb's in-custody confession to police,8"
and Cobb's pre-custody confession to his father.8
70. Id. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *2-3.
71. Id. at 4-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *2-3.
72. Id. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
73. See id., 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
74. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that a suspect must
be warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, if he so desires).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . .

").

76. Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 2-3, 2000 WL 275644, at *5 (McCormick, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 3, 2000 WL 275644, at *5 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 4, 2000 WL 275644, at *6 (McCormick, J., dissenting); Allan Turner,
Prosecutors Tell of Burial Site in Woods; Search for 2 Bodies Described by Officer,
HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 21, 1997, § A, at 25, available at 1997 WL 6541517.
79. Turner, supra note 78, § A, at 25.

80. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 4, 2000 WL 275644, at *2.
81. Man Testifies Son Confessed in 1993 Slaying of Woman,
NEWS, Feb. 21, 1997, § D, at 12.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

DALLAS MORNING

9

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 8 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 7

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 8

The Holding

Based on the confessions and the recovered evidence, a jury convicted Cobb of capital murder and sentenced him to death. 82 However, the Texas Court later reversed Cobb's conviction,8 3 holding that
authorities violated Cobb's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when

they obtained his confession.84 The Texas Court reasoned that because Cobb's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the
"factually interwoven" burglary charge, this right also attached to the

murders that Cobb committed during the commission of the burglary. 85 Because the interrogation about the murders was a policeinitiated interrogation, Cobb did not validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.8 6 The Texas Court found that it
did not matter that Odessa investigators were unaware that Cobb had
an attorney because Walker County investigators had knowledge of
it.87 Rather, the Texas Court judicially imputed Walker County investigators' knowledge to Odessa investigators.88 Cobb's case was remanded for a new trial.89 The State appealed to the Supreme Court,
and the Texas Court's decision was ultimately reversed.9"
C.

The Texas Court's Analysis

The Texas Court addressed two specific questions regarding the ap-

plication of the Sixth Amendment in Cobb: (1) Does a "closely related" exception apply to the "offense specific" nature of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel; 9 and (2) May a "defendant whose Sixth

Amendment right to counsel has attached to an offense unilaterally
...[waive his] right'92to counsel upon a police-initiated interrogation
about this offense?
Citing the Third Circuit case of United States v. Arnold,93 the Texas
Court held that the "closely related" exception applied to Cobb's con82. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 3, 8, 2000 WL 275644, at "1,*4.See also TEX. PEN.
§ 19.03 (Vernon 1994) (defining capital murder).
83. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 8,2000 WL 275644, at *5.
84. Id. at 7-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *4-5.
85. Id. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
86. See id. at 6-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-4 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625, 636 (1986)).
87. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
88. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
89. Id. at 1, 2000 WL 275644, at *2.
90. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1344 (2001), rev'g Cobb v. State, No. 72,807,
2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc).
91. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *3; State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d
324, 328-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548, 555-56
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
92. Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 11, 2000 WL 275644, at *8 (McCormick, J.,
dissenting).
93. 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997).
CODE ANN.
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fession.9 4 In Arnold, the Third Circuit recognized that courts "look[ ]

for similarities of time, place, person, and conduct '95 to determine
whether the "closely related" exception applies.96 The Texas Court
stated that Cobb's right to counsel for the burglary charge carried
over to the murders because it was "very closely related factually to
the offense charged." 97 The Texas Court reasoned that the "closely
related" test prevents the government from knowingly circumventing
"'the Sixth Amendment right to counsel merely by charging a defendant with additional related crimes' after questioning him without
counsel present"98 or "by charging predicate crimes with the purpose
of questioning a suspect on an aggravated crime." 99
Having decided that the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the
confession, the Texas Court held that investigators should not have
initiated questioning of Cobb about the murders without permission
from his attorney."° ' The Texas Court relied on the Supreme Court
case of Michigan v. Jackson,1"1 which established that a suspect cannot
make a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the
interrogation is police-initiated." 2 As for Odessa investigators' lack
of knowledge about Cobb's appointed counsel, the Texas Court determined that the "'Sixth Amendment . .. require[d] that [the Court]

impute the State's knowledge from one state actor to another."' 1 3
The Texas Court explained that "'[o]ne set of state actors... may not
claim ignorance of defendants' unequivocal request for counsel to another state actor."" 0 4 Therefore, before the Odessa police could lawfully question Cobb about the Owings murders, they were under an
obligation to contact Cobb's attorney and obtain permission. 0 5
D. The Supreme Court's Analysis

On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected the "closely
related" line of reasoning by stating that the decision in McNeil
"meant what it said, and that the Sixth Amendment right is 'offense
94. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-4.
95. Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41.
96. Id. at 41-42.

97. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *3 (citing Arnold, 106 F.3d at
41; State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d 324, 328-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); Upton v.
State, 853 S.W.2d 548, 555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc)).
98. Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41.
99. Upton, 853 S.W.2d at 556.
100. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
101. 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Cobb v. State, slip op. at 6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
102. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
103. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *4 (quoting Jackson, 475 U.S.
at 634).
104. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *4 (quoting Jackson, 475 U.S. at 634).
105. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the correct standard

for determining whether the right to counsel attaches to two separate
charges was established in Blockburger v. United States.' °7 In Blockburger, the Supreme Court held that "where the same act or transac-

tion constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only

one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not." 108 Under Texas law, burglary and capital murder each contain different elements of proof, so they are not the same offense
under the Blockburger test.1" 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that to
hold otherwise would unnecessarily frustrate investigations because
police officers may not be "aware of the exact sequence and scope of
events they are investigating."'1 ° Adhering to the "closely related"

exception would likely cause police to "refrain from questioning cer-

tain defendants altogether"'1 1 because of the "possibility of violating

the Sixth Amendment.' 1 12 Furthermore, the majority stated that the
Blockburger test adequately affords Sixth Amendment protection to
defendants of unindicted offenses that "even if not formally charged,
13
would be considered the same offense" as the indicted offense.'
Because the outcome of Cobb was decided without considering

whether an indicted defendant may waive his right to counsel upon a
police-initiated
interrogation, the Supreme Court declined to address
14
this issue.'

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF TEXAS V. COBB

The "Closely Related" Confusion

In Cobb, the Texas Court chose yet another phrase describing the
"closely related" test when it discussed the "factually interwoven" nature of the burglary to the murders."' The Texas Court's reasoning
was similar to that of many other courts that had previously excluded
106. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1339 (2001), rev'g Cobb v. State, No. 72,807,
2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc).
107. Id. at 1343.
108. Id. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
109. Id. at 1344 (pointing out that burglary and capital murder each contain elements that the other does not). Burglary is committed when, "without the effective
consent of the owner, [a] person enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a
building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an
assault." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Capital murder is
committed if a person "murders more than one person ... during the same criminal
transaction." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 1994).
110. Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. at 1343.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1344.
113. Id. at 1343.
114. Id. at 1340.
115. Id.
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evidence through application of the "closely related" test.1 16 These
same courts, however, needlessly overturned convictions in applying
the "closely related" test because they failed to recognize a major reason why the Supreme Court decided Brewer and Moulton how it did.
The Supreme Court focused on police misconduct, not the close relation of the indicted offense to the later charged offense." 7
The detective in Brewer elicited incriminating statements from the
defendant during a lengthy car trip with him, even after assuring the
defendant's counsel that no interrogation would occur." 8 Similarly, in
Moulton, police violated the Sixth Amendment when they knowingly
circumvented the defendant's right to counsel by concealing the fact
that his accomplice was acting as their agent.1 1 9 The Supreme Court
held that by such conduct "the police denied [the defendant] the opportunity to consult with counsel and thus denied him the assistance
of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."' 2 ° Even the Texas
Court's own opinions that the majority cited as precedent for applying
the "closely related" test involved misconduct on the part of authorities.1 ' The majority failed to make this distinction when it decided
Cobb.'2 2
Instead of relying on the "closely related" exception, the Texas
Court should have used Brewer and Moulton to uphold Cobb's confession. Unlike the facts of Brewer and Moulton, there was no attempt by investigators to knowingly circumvent Cobb's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 2 3 Odessa police informed Cobb of his
right to counsel before interrogating him about the murders.12 4 The
116. See supra notes 47-56.
117. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 177 (1985); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404-05 (1977). See also Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1341 ("The Court's opinion
[in Brewer] ...simply did not address the significance of the fact that the suspect had
been arraigned only on the abduction charge, nor did the parties in any way argue this
question."); id. at 1342 ("[T]he Moulton Court did not address the question now
before us, and to the extent Moulton spoke to the matter at all, it expressly referred to
the offense-specific nature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
118. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391-93.
119. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176-77.
120. Id. at 177.
121. State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d 324, 329-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (holding that it was a Sixth Amendment violation for an assistant district attorney to continue to elicit incriminating statements from a defendant despite being advised by the
defendant that he was represented by an attorney); Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548,
557-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a detective who convinced the
defendant to talk to the police despite an instruction from the defendant's attorney
telling him not to talk to the police violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
122. See Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 1-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *1-5 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
123. See id., 2000 WL 275644, at *1-5; Texas v. Cobb, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1342 (2001)
("In the present case, police scrupulously followed Miranda'sdictates when questioning respondent."), rev'g Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, 2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App.
Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc).
124. See Cobb v. State, slip op. at 5-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
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evidence suggests that Cobb voluntarily waived this right. 25 However, the majority of the Texas Court did not take the lack of police
misconduct into consideration; rather,
the majority adhered to the
1 26
overly broad "closely related" test.
Furthermore, Odessa investigators' lack of knowledge about Cobb's
counsel for the pending burglary charge negated any suggestion that
they intentionally circumvented Cobb's Sixth Amendment right 12
to7
counsel when they questioned him about the related murders.
Walker County investigators' knowledge that Cobb had counsel on
the burglary charge did not provide an adequate reason to set aside a
confession obtained in good faith. 1 28 However, citing Michigan v.
Jackson,'2 9 the Texas Court held that before the Odessa police could
lawfully question appellant about the Owings murders, they were
under an obligation to contact Cobb's attorney and obtain permission. 130 Having failed to do so, the Texas Court held that "the fruits of
the Odessa police interrogation, including appellant's written statement, were inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief."' 1 The
Texas Court applied too broad of a standard when it suppressed the
confession
despite evidence that Odessa investigators acted with good
132
faith.

Guidance could have been obtained by looking at another federal
court decision involving the Sixth Amendment. In United States v.
Crouch, 3 3 the Fifth Circuit analyzed a claim that a defendant's due
process rights were violated when detectives failed to timely investigate a crime.134 The defendant claimed that his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial 135 had been denied by the delay. 1 36 The court
held that "preindictment delay does not violate due process unless
125. See Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1344 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In the instant
case, Cobb at no time indicated to law enforcement authorities that he elected to
remain silent about the double murder."). See also Cobb v. State, slip op. at 5-6, 2000
WL 275644, at *3.
126. See Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-5.
127. See id. at 5-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
128. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of [negligent or willful] conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an
accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
Id.
129. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
130. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
131. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
132. See generally id. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *3 (indicating that Odessa investigators were not informed that Cobb already had counsel).
133. 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
134. Id. at 1505.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial.").
136. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1503-05.
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that delay, in addition to prejudicing the accused, was intentionally
brought about by the government for the purpose of gaining some
tactical advantage over the accused in the contemplated prosecution
or for some other bad faith purpose."13' 7 As in Crouch, nothing in the
facts of Cobb suggests that detectives acted in bad faith in order to
gain a tactical advantage; 1 38 therefore, the Supreme Court rightly decided that the confession was admissible.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cobb was based on the United
States Constitution. 139 However, Texas courts are not precluded in
future cases from applying the "closely related" exception when inter140
preting the right to counsel provisions of the Texas Constitution.
While states may afford more constitutional rights to defendants, the
Texas Court has traditionally held that such rights are interpreted the
same as the federal standards.' 4 ' To avoid further confusion on the
"closely related" issue, the Texas Court should follow the Supreme
Court's guidance in Cobb.
B.

Questions Unanswered-Defendant'sAbility to
Waive Assistance of Counsel

The Supreme Court did not address the Texas Court's opinion that
Cobb could not have validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because Cobb's confession was police-initiated. 4 2 However,
the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of whether a defendant
may unilaterally waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in both
Michigan v. Jackson14 3 and Brewer v. Williams.|4 4 Remarkably, the
1 45
Supreme Court reached different opinions on the issue in each case.
As Justice McCormick points out in his dissenting opinion, the majority of the Texas Court relied on Michigan v. Jackson, 4 6 which applied
"Fifth Amendment Miranda v. Arizona/Edwards v. Arizona prophy137. Id. at 1523.
138. See Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 5-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-4 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
139. See Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 1339 (2001), rev'g Cobb v. State, No.
72,807, 2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc).
140. See supra note 22.
141. See Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 243 & n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en
banc) (noting that Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution provides the same
protection as the federal constitution does with regard to an impartial jury drawn
from a source made up of a fair cross section of the community); Hull v. State, 699
S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (noting that Article I, Section 10 of
the Texas Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial, and the test applied
under either the state or federal constitution is the same).
142. See Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. at 1340-41.
143. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
144. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
145. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636; Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405-06.
146. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, dissent slip op. at 14-15, 2000 WL 275644, at *10
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc) (McCormick, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
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lactic procedural rules to the Sixth Amendment context."14' 7 Relying

on Supreme Court precedent, the Texas Court held that once the right
to counsel has attached, any subsequent waiver during police-initiated
interrogation is ineffective.148 However, as Justice McCormick explains, this language is contradicted by Brewer v. Williams. 49
In Brewer, Justice Stewart wrote for the majority that although the
defendant did not waive his right to counsel, 50 the majority did not
hold that "[the defendant] could not, without notice to counsel, have
waived his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 151
Justice Powell later reiterated this point when he wrote:
[T]he opinion of the Court is explicitly clear that the right to assistance of counsel may be waived, after it has attached, without notice
to or consultation with counsel. We would have such a case here if
petitioner had proved that the police officers refrained from coercion and interrogation, as they had agreed, and that [the
52 defendant]
freely on his own initiative had confessed the crime.'
In Michigan v. Jackson,5 3 the Supreme Court inexplicably departed
from its reasoning in Brewer, holding that "if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to
counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.' 1 54 Instead of
overruling Brewer, however, the Supreme Court in Jackson actually
relied on Brewer. 5 5 As Justice McCormick points out, "[t]his is curious since Brewer is flatly inconsistent with and contrary to Jackson's
holding."' 56 "This creates a conflict between Brewer and Jackson either of which the Court may choose to apply.' 1 57 The 58
majority failed
to see the conflict when they chose to apply Jackson.1
Assuming that Jackson was the correct standard, the majority of the
court also failed to recognize that Cobb, unlike the defendant in Jackson, 1 59 did not assert his right to counsel at any time before the police147. Id. at 15, 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
148. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 6-7, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-4 (citing Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986)).
149. Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 16, 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J.,
dissenting).
150. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405.

151. Id. at 405-06.
152. Id. at 413 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
153. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
154. Id. at 636.
155. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, dissent slip op. at 16, 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (Tex.

Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc) (McCormick, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson, 475
U.S. at 635 n.9), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
156. Id. at 16, 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson,
475 U.S. at 640 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
157. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
158. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
159. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627.
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initiated interrogation.160 Rather, Cobb's attorney was appointed by
the court to represent Cobb in the burglary case.161 This distinction is
important because the Fifth Circuit ruled that a Jackson assertion requires an "actual, positive statement or affirmation of the right to
counsel. 1 62 In Jackson, the Supreme Court stated that "additional
safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel."' 6 3 This
language is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Patterson
v. Illinois164 which held that Jackson applies "once an accused even
requests the assistance of counsel. ' 165 The purpose of the rule upheld
in Jackson was to protect defendants' "choice to communicate with
police only through counsel"' 66 because of the belief that such defendants "are unlikely to waive that right voluntarily in subsequent interrogations.' 1 67 Because Cobb failed to make such an assertion, he
should not be able to argue later that Odessa police violated a right
that he never invoked. 68
V.

ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR CONVICTION

Even with the Texas Court's decision to apply the confusing
"closely related" test as an exception to the "offense specific" requirement of the Sixth Amendment, the Texas Court still could have found
that Cobb's confession was admissible
on alternative grounds, as illus1 69
trated in the following sections.
A. The Federal Exclusionary Rule
1. The Brady Materiality Standard
The exclusionary rule is a remedy designed by courts providing that
when evidence has been obtained in violation of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, such evidence may not be used at the
trial of a defendant. 7 ° In Brady v. Maryland, 7 ' the Supreme Court
upheld application of the exclusionary rule for violation of such a
160. Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 16-17, 2000 WL 275644, at *11 (McCormick,
J., dissenting).
161. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 7, 2000 WL 275644, at *4.
162. Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1992).
163. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
164. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
165. Id. at 290 n.3.
166. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
167. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).
168. See Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, dissent slip op. at 16-18, 21-22, 2000 WL

275644, at *11-12 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc) (McCormick, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
169. See infra Part V.A-D.

170. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 587 (7th ed. 1999); Alison H. Southall & Robert L.
Jacobsen, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 87 GEO. L.J. 1519,
1522-23 (1999).
171. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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right.' 72 Although Brady dealt with the omission of exculpatory evidence, 7 3 the exclusionary rule has been applied to other violations of
constitutional rights.174 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution."'' 75 "[E]vidence is material ...if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different ... [or] confi1 76

dence in the outcome" of the trial would have been undermined.
"A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome" of the trial.' 77 The purpose of the exclusionary rule provided in Brady is not punishment of society for the
misconduct of government agents but avoidance of an unfair trial to
the accused.' 7 8 The Supreme Court reasoned that "[s]ociety wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
79
fair."1
The materiality standard of Brady provides the correct standard for
applying the exclusionary rule. Instead of determining whether the
burglary and murders were "closely related," the Texas Court should
have asked whether society's confidence in Cobb's guilt on the burglary charge would have reasonably been changed if Odessa investigators had not obtained his murder confession. 181 Cobb had already
confessed committing the burglary to Odessa investigators,1 8' so the
second interrogation did not prejudice his Sixth Amendment right on
the burglary charge.' 82
Furthermore, courts should be cautious when applying the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon, 183 the Supreme Court held that
"[i]ndiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule . . . may well
172. See id. at 90-91.
173. Id. at 84-85.
174. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964) (applying the exclusionary rule to violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 563-64 (1897)
(applying the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fifth Amendment right to silence).
175. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
176. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
177. Id.
178. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (discussing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103

(1935)).
179. Id.
180. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)).
181. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 4-5, 2000 WL 275644, at *2 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).
182. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
183. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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'generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice.' ' 18 4
Any court applying the exclusionary rule should understand that the
function of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct rather
than to protect a personal constitutional right. 85 In the facts of Cobb,
there was no willful misconduct by law enforcement officials. 8 6 In

such a circumstance, the Texas Court should have applied rationale
that focused on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and
recognized the need for the questioning of suspects like Cobb with
respect to serious crimes. 187 Valid confessions are "more than merely
'desirable.' "188 Valid confessions "are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate
the law."1'89

2. The "Independent Source" Doctrine
If Odessa investigators denied Cobb assistance of counsel in direct
violation of the Sixth Amendment, Cobb's confession still could have

been upheld because the federal exclusionary rule is subject to the
"independent source" doctrine recognized in Murray v. United
States.1 90 This doctrine was developed specifically to serve as a check

on the exclusionary rule.1 9' In Murray, law enforcement officers illegally forced entry into a warehouse and observed burlap bags in plain
93
view.1 9 2 The officers later discovered marijuana in the burlap bags.'
The officers left the warehouse without disturbing the bags and then
obtained a search warrant. 94 The officers did not mention their prior
entry, nor did they rely on observations made during that entry, in
their application for the search warrant. 95 A judge issued the warrant, and the officers then conducted a second search of the warehouse and seized the burlap bags containing the marijuana.1 96
In assessing whether the evidence discovered during the second
search could be admitted, the Supreme Court examined the applicability of the independent source doctrine.' 97 The Supreme Court
noted that it had developed this doctrine as a direct consequence of
the exclusionary rule because
184. Id. at 908 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)).
185. Id. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
186. See Cobb v. State, slip op. at 5-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-5.
187. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973).
188. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977)).

189. Id.
190. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
191. See id. at 537.

192. Id. at 535.
193. Id.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
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"[t]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and
the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of
a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not
a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or
misconduct had occurred.... When the challenged evidence has an
independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position
'' 98 than they would have been in absent any
error or violation.
While the facts of Cobb do not include a search warrant, the issue of
independently obtained information is relevant. 199 Cobb confessed to
his father before confessing to police;2 °° therefore, his confession
should not have been excluded because it was independently obtained
from the police interrogation. However, while the prosecution may
have used the independent source doctrine, it was not necessary to
invoke the doctrine in Cobb. Some sort of police or prosecutorial error or misconduct must exist before a court may even look for imposition of the independent source doctrine.2"' Under the facts of Cobb,
the use of the doctrine would have been irrelevant if the Texas Court
had recognized Cobb's ability to waive his right to counsel.
The Texas Court has repeatedly refused to incorporate the independent source doctrine in Texas on state suppression issues. 20 2 In Garcia
v. State, the Texas Court held that the independent source doctrine 20is3
irrelevant because Texas has provided a stricter exclusionary rule
than the federal rule.20 4 However, this line of reasoning has been
strongly criticized by several judges on the Texas Court.20 5
B.

The Texas Exclusionary Rule

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 20 6 provides the relevant
form of the exclusionary rule applied in Cobb:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of
any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or
of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be
198. Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
199. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (allowing evidence to be admitted if it is more likely than not to be discovered through a source independent of the
illegal activity).
200. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *3 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
201. See, e.g., Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (applying the independent source doctrine

when the police illegally entered a warehouse and seized evidence).
202. See Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 798-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc).
203. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
204. See Garcia, 829 S.W.2d at 798.
205. See id. at 801-03; Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 709, 711-13 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (McCormick, J., dissenting).
206. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23(a).
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admitted
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal
20 7
case.

Again, even if Odessa investigators denied Cobb assistance of counsel
in direct violation of the Sixth Amendment, Cobb's confession still
could have been upheld because in Texas, the exclusionary rule is subject to the attenuation of taint doctrine." 8 The Texas Court recognized this doctrine in Johnson v. State.2°9 The appellee in Johnson was
suspected by Harris County investigators in a double homicide.210 Investigators received information that the defendant had fled to Austin, Texas. 211 Harris County investigators notified Austin investigators
who then assisted.212 Austin investigators located the girlfriend and
obtained a written statement from her that implicated the defendant
in the murders.213 The statement was faxed to Harris County investigators who then attempted to obtain an arrest warrant.21 4 Meanwhile,
as Austin investigators were returning the girlfriend to her place of
employment, they observed the defendant enter her car.215 Investigators immediately arrested the defendant approximately two-and-onehalf hours before Harris County investigators were able to obtain the
warrant.216 The defendant gave investigators a written statement approximately three hours after the warrant was finally obtained.21 7
On appeal, the defendant argued that because he was illegally arrested, the subsequent statement should have been suppressed under
the exclusionary rule.218 However, the Texas Court allowed the confession to stand.219 Following the conclusions of the court of appeals,
the Texas Court reasoned that the attenuation doctrine applies "if the
evidence is so attenuated from the illegal conduct that it cannot be
said to be a product of the illegality."220 The Texas Court referred to
the Supreme Court case of Brown v. Illinois22 as the proper authority
in determining the application of the "attenuation of taint"
doctrine.2 22

207. Id.
208. See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc) (citing
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)).
209. 871 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
210. Id. at 746.
211. Id.
212. See id.

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 746 & n.1.

217. See id.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See id. at 745, 748-49.
Id. at 745, 751.
Id. at 750.
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 751.
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In Brown, the Supreme Court set forth the following factors for
courts to consider in answering whether there is a significant break in
events between the illegal conduct and the confession: (1) the presence or absence of Miranda warnings; (2) the temporal proximity of
the arrest and the confession; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 223 The Supreme Court further explained that "[t]he
voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement," and that
the government has the burden of proving the admissibility of the
challenged confession. 224 In the end, courts must ascertain whether
the means used to obtain a confession were "compatible with a system
that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means [or] whether the defendant's will was in
fact overborne. ' 2 2 5 The flagrancy of official misconduct weighs the
heaviest in evaluating attenuation of taint.226
While the facts of Cobb do not include an illegal arrest,2 27 the attenuation of taint doctrine .can easily be applied to the facts. Cobb received a Miranda warning from Odessa Police. 2 8 Although Cobb's
confession occurred shortly after his arrest in Odessa, it occurred
nearly sixty days after Walker County detectives last questioned
him. 29 Finally, the questioning detectives were unaware that Cobb
had counsel in the pending burglary charge,2 30 negating any flagrant
official misconduct. All of these variables certainly indicate sufficient
intervening circumstances to allow the confession to stand.
C. Bad Faith Requirement for Prophylactic ProceduralViolations

While the concept of assistance of counsel includes fundamental
rules of due process, "prophylactic rules of procedure [have been] designed, in most cases by the Legislature, to impose a uniform requirement where the fairness of a flexible rule is too uncertain. ' 231 In
Miranda v. Arizona,2 32 the Supreme Court recognized that in a coercive environment, certain protections are necessary to "assure that the
[defendant] is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. ' 233 To
223. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.
224. Id. at 604.
225. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985).
226. See Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
227. See Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, 2000 WL 275644 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15,
2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
228. Id. at 5-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
229. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
230. Id. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
231. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc),
rev'd on other grounds, 891 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
232. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
233. See id. at 439.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol8/iss1/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V8.I1.5

22

Crowder: Texas v. Cobb, The United States Supreme Court Limits the Sixth A

2001]

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL

101

accomplish this measure, the Supreme Court created the prophylactic
procedural safeguard of the Miranda warning. 3 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court created another prophylactic procedural rule when it
barred police from initiating an interrogation with an indicted defendant.2 35 However, the Supreme Court recognized the difference between fundamental rights and prophylactic procedural rules when it
held that it had "never prevented use by the prosecution of relevant
voluntary statements by a defendant, particularly when the violations
alleged by a defendant relate only to procedural safeguards that are
'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,' 36 but are instead measures designed to ensure that constitutional rights are protected.''2 37 The Supreme Court has also held that the "search for truth
in a criminal case '238 outweighs the "speculative possibility" that exclusion of evidence might deter future violations of rules not directly
compelled by the Constitution. 3 9
Cobb was not denied assistance of counsel in direct violation of the
Sixth Amendment.2 40 At most, only a procedural safeguard was violated when investigators obtained Cobb's confession without first receiving his attorney's permission. 24 1 Therefore, even if Cobb's
confession was obtained in violation of a prophylactic rule meant to
safeguard Sixth Amendment rights, "[t]he 'fruits' of voluntary confessions obtained in violation of prophylactic [procedural] rules are admissible. '242 Before excluding such evidence, courts have looked to
whether there was any misconduct on the part of authorities. 43 Furthermore, when reviewing allegations of the right to counsel, the
Texas Court has held that it should examine "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" and the alleged invoca-

234. Id. at 478-79; Elizabeth E. Levy, Non-Continuous Custody and the MirandaEdwards Rule: Break in Custody Severs Safeguards, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 539, 543-44 (1994). But cf. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326,
2333 (2000) (stating that "Miranda is a constitutional decision"). However, the Supreme Court declined to overrule prior decisions that held Miranda to be a prophylactic measure. See id.
235. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
236. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444 (1974)) (discussing Miranda,384 U.S. at 436).
237. Id.
238.0Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).
239. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 '(1980) (citing Hass, 420 U.S. at
722-23).
240. See Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 6-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-5 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
241. See Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 23, 2000 WL 275644, at *13 (McCormick,
J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986); Baker v. State,
956 S.W.2d 19, 23-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)).
242. Id. at 23, 2000 WL 275644, at *13 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).
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tion. 244 However, the Texas Court appears to have ignored its own
precedent by its decision in Cobb.245 Finally, as Justice McCormick
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, violations of the Sixth Amendment prophylactic protections are subject to a "harmless error" analysis. 246 Cobb's confession to investigators could be considered
"harmless" because Cobb's247father also testified about a pre-custody
confession Cobb gave him.
D.

The "Break in Custody" Miranda Rule

The Texas Court chose to apply the Jackson standard when it held
that police could not initiate the questioning of Cobb.248 However, in
applying the Jackson standard, the majority of the Texas Court failed

to recognize a crucial factual distinction between Cobb and Jackson.249 In Jackson, police initiated questioning of the defendants
shortly after an arraignment, and there was no break in custody
before interrogation.25 ° In Cobb, however, police initiated question-

ing over fifteen months after Cobb's arraignment while he was out on
bond for the burglary charge.2 5 ' It is important to recognize that the

Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson relied on protections already established in Edwards.2 The Supreme Court appears to have suggested that a break in custody might render the Edwards rule
inapplicable. 53 In fact, a number of courts have already ruled that

Edwards does not apply when there has been a break in custody that
244. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (citing
Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 45-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Russell v.
State, 727 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc)).
245. See Cobb v. State, slip op. at 6-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *3-5; Garcia v. State,
829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc); Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700
(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
246. See Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 22-23, 2000 WL 275644, at *12 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (citing Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998) (en banc)). "If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional
error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a
judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment." TEx. R.
App. P. 44.2(a).
247. See Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 22-23, 2000 WL 275644, at *12 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (citing Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998) (en banc)); Turner, supra note 78, § A, at 25.
248. See Cobb v. State, slip op. at 6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
249. Cobb v. State, dissent slip op. at 16, 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J.,
dissenting).
250. Id., 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
251. Cobb v. State, slip op. at 4-5, 2000 WL 275644, at *2-3; Cobb v. State, dissent
slip op. at 16, 2000 WL 275644, at *10 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (noting the discrepancy between the timeline of fifteen months and twenty-eight days and the dissent's
statement of seventeen months).
252. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986).
253. State v. Consaul, 982 S.W.2d 899, 900-01 & n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en
banc) (per curiam) (Price, J., concurring) (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
176-77 (1991)).
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affords the defendant a significant opportunity to seek assistance of
counsel.2 5 4 The Texas Court, however, has never ruled on how a
break in custody might affect an Edwards claim.2 55
A break in custody should negate the Edwards rule because "the
inherently coercive nature of custody itself is diminished and there is
little to no risk of badgering by the authorities. '256 This language is
consistent with the Supreme Court's definition of the federal due process standard for voluntary confessions; "[i]s the confession the prod2 57
uct of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?
Similarly, the Texas Court has recognized in a prior decision that "determination of whether a confession is voluntary under the ...United
States Constitution must be based upon an examination of the totality
of the circumstances surrounding its acquisition. "258 This burden
would not be hard to overcome, given that nearly sixty days had
passed since Cobb was last questioned about the crimes, 9 that Cobb
was reminded of his right to counsel when investigators read him the
Miranda warning, 2 60 and that he outwardly manifested his waiver of
this right.2 61 The Texas Court's decision in Cobb ignored the "totality
of the circumstances" language.2 62
VI.

CONCLUSION

The exclusionary rule should apply to confessions obtained when a
defendant is denied assistance of counsel in direct violation of the
Sixth Amendment, regardless of misconduct on the part of government agents. In the interest of justice, however, the Texas Court
should recognize the independent source doctrine to counter the drastic effects of the exclusionary rule. Additionally, the attenuation of
taint doctrine should continue to be available to the prosecution.
254. See United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 256-57 (9th Cir. 1992); Dunkins v.
Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397-98 (11th Cir. 1988); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654,
661 (4th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 125 (7th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
255. See Consaul, 982 S.W.2d at 904 (Keller, J., dissenting).

The [break in custody] issue in the present case is an important one and one
of first impression in this state. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
protections in Edwards are not implicated when there has been a break in
custody.... I believe this Court should address the issue.
Id. (Keller, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
256. United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 1998).

257. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (quoting Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
258. Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
259. Cobb v. State, No. 72,807, slip op. at 5-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3 (Tex. Crim.
App. Mar. 15, 2000) (en banc), rev'd, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001).
260. Id. at 5, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.

261. See id. at 5-6, 2000 WL 275644, at *3.
262. See id. at 1-8, 2000 WL 275644, at *1-5.
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Unlike direct Sixth Amendment violations, however, violations of
Sixth Amendment procedural rules should be subject to the exclusionary rule only when there is evidence of misconduct on the part of a
government agent. Accordingly, absent misconduct designed to circumvent the protections of the Sixth Amendment, police should not
be barred from interrogating an in-custody defendant about an
unindicted charge without notice to counsel, regardless of its close relation to the indicted charge. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment
protections should apply only after a defendant has affirmatively asserted his right to counsel. Finally, by applying a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine the voluntary nature of confessions, the
Texas Court should recognize a criminal defendant's ability to unilaterally waive assistance of counsel when there has been a reasonable
break in custody after the right to counsel has attached.
Michael E. Crowder
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